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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________ 
The neoclassical growth model is extended to include costly intermediated borrowing and lending be-
tween households. This is an important extension as substantial resources are used in intermediating the 
large amount of borrowing and lending between households. In 2007, in the United States, the amount in-
termediated was 1.7 times GNP, and the resources used in this intermediation amounted to at least 3.4 
percent of GNP. The theory implies that financial intermediation services are an intermediate good and 
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There is a rich class of models that study savings for retirement. But these models 
abstract from the large costs of financial intermediation, despite the fact that most savings 
are intermediated.  This paper extends the neoclassical growth model by incorporating an 
intermediation  sector.  It  does  so  in  such  a  way  that  it  matches  both  the  amount  of 
borrowing and lending between households and the resources used in intermediation. 
Furthermore, all the appealing characteristics of the standard neoclassical growth model 
remain unaltered. In addition, the model provides a suitable framework to evaluate not 
only  efficiency  gains  from  innovations  in  the  financial  sector  but  also  the  impact  of 
demographic changes on intermediation and saving behavior.  
Our  paper  presents  model  that  is  consistent  with  the  economic  growth  facts, 
documented  by  Kaldor  (1961)  and  used  by  Solow  (1969)  and  provides  a  prototype 
framework  that  allows  us  to  address  the  amount  of  borrowing  and  lending  between 
households and the resources used in intermediation. To the best of our knowledge this is 
the first such extension. One interpretation of our model would be a theory of growth 
with financial intermediation. Given the large amount of recourses used in intermediation 
we consider this to be an important extension of the existing growth models.  
  In 2007, for the U.S economy, intermediation was large, around 1.7 times the 
annual  Gross  National  Product  (GNP).
1  The  resources  used  in  this  process  were  not 
inconsequential, amounting to at least 3.4 percent of GNP. These two figures together 
imply that the average household borrowing rate is at least 2 percent higher than the 
                                                 
1 About half of this is intermediated lending by commercial banks. The other half is lending by other 
financial intermediaries such as mutual organizations.  
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average household lending rate. Relative to the level of the observed average rates of 
return on debt and equity securities this spread is far from being insignificant. 
 Since our model abstracts from aggregate risk, by construction there is no premium 
for bearing aggregate risk. As explained later, the household borrowing rate is equal to 
the return on equity. The government can borrow at a lower rate than households – as 
empirically observed.  Consequently there is a difference in the return on equity and the 
interest rate on government debt.  For our calibrated economy this difference is 2 percent, 
and abstracting from it may be inappropriate when computing statistics that report the 
spread between different rates of return in the economy. We discuss this in Section 8. 
Since in equilibrium the total amount borrowed by households is equal to the total 
amount of intermediated lending by households, a natural question that arises is who are 
the borrowers and lenders?  In our model, where the only reason for households to save is 
to finance retirement over an uncertain lifetime, one set of households choose to save by 
accumulating  capital  and  a  second  set  by  purchasing  annuities.  Since  capital 
accumulation is partially financed by owners’ equity and the remainder by borrowing, 
capital owners are the borrowers. In addition, since purchasing annuities is isomorphic to 
lending, annuity holders are the lenders. 
We caution the reader regarding two issues. First, the model counterpart of 
annuities is not limited to commercial annuities but includes, more importantly, defined 
benefit pension plans and even more importantly annuity-like promises of the 
government, such as Social Security and Medicare. We think of these plans as mandatory 
purchases of annuities. As pointed out by Abel (1987), Social Security and Medicare are 
implicit government liabilities and can be regarded as annuity-like promises of the  
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government. When we examine some implications of our theory, we will include these 
annuity-like promises as part of annuity-like assets held by households. 
Payments for these “annuities” are made throughout the working life of 
households and our model tries to capture this. Empirically, commercially available 
annuities, purchased at or near retirement account for a very small fraction of savings for 
retirement due to well-known adverse selection issues. Consequently our paper abstracts 
from these annuities. The biggest annuities are in the form of Social Security retirement 
benefits and Medicare, which are mandatory purchases of annuities during a household’s 
working life. In addition, there are defined benefit retirement plans, which are essentially 
annuities that people effectively purchase during their working life.    
An integral part of our analysis is that households endogenously borrow and lend. 
Some households lend to financial intermediaries while others borrow from these 
intermediaries to partially finance the capital investment in the businesses they own. 
While there is a myriad of reasons why households borrow and lend, in our model, for 
simplicity, we motivate this by only one such reason (the intensity for bequests). This 
keeps the analysis simple and tractable. The reasons matter little for the inference we 
draw.   
 Later in Section 8, when we examine some implications of our theory, we will 
include these annuity-like promises as part of annuity assets held by model households.
2 
Second,  we  follow  the  tradition  in  macroeconomics  assuming  that  households 
own all the capital in the economy and rent it to businesses. Thus, we treat the capital 
                                                 
2 W e  r e e m p h a s i z e  t h a t  w h e n  w e  u s e  t h e  a n n u i t y  c o n s t r u c t  i n  this  paper,  it  includes  all  annuity-like 
payments, including Social Security, Medicare, defined benefit pension plans and the small amount of 
commercial annuities.  
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owned by businesses as capital owned by the owners of these businesses, and therefore, 
all debt of non financial businesses is debt of our household sector.   
The output of the intermediary sector is an intermediary good. The value added by 
intermediation services is equal to the amount of borrowing times its price minus the 
amount of lending times its price.  In equilibrium, the amount borrowed is equal to the 
amount lent. Hence, the price of this service is equal to the spread between the average 
borrowing and lending rates. Improvements in the financial system which reduce this 
spread are efficiency gains.  
In 2007, about half the U.S. capital stock, the value of which was 3.4 times GNP, 
was financed by borrowing and half by owners’ equity. This borrowing is done to finance 
owner-occupied housing, by proprietorships and partnerships to finance unincorporated 
businesses, and by shared ownership corporations to finance businesses. Households who 
own  capital  finance  it  partially  by  borrowing  and  partially  by  equity.  Further,  the 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds for our economy as for a given firm the debt-equity 
financing decision does not matter.  In the aggregate, total equity and private debt are 
determined. 
 
Reason for household borrowing 
We begin our study by examining household saving decision. In practice, most 
household savings are for retirement. However, some of it is held in highly liquid kind of 




3 Abstracting from these factors has little consequence for aggregate lending. In 
our model households choose between two savings strategies. One strategy is to invest in 
equity and earn a real return of   percent. The other strategy is to purchase a lifetime 
annuity, which is actuarially fair at   percent. Since the lifetime remaining after 
retirement is uncertain, households that choose the annuity option are in effect buying 
insurance against outliving their savings.  
But,  why  do  some  households  choose  to  save  by  lending  to  financial 
intermediaries (with a low return) while others invest in equities (with a high return)? In 
this study this is due to household heterogeneity in the form of differences in the strength 
of preferences for bequests. That is, we assume that people are identical in all aspects 
other than the intensity of their bequest motive. The only source of uncertainty is the 
duration of the lifetime after retirement. Hence, an important difference between both 
strategies  is  that  buying  equities  strategy  generates  bequests  upon  death  equal  to  net 
worth at the time of death, while buying annuities does not.
4 For our calibrated economy 
people with low, say nil, bequest motive will prefer the annuity strategy while agents 
with even a modest bequest motive will prefer equities.
5 The strength of the bequest 
motive  has  little  consequence  for  aggregate  bequests  with  bequest  being  largely 
accidental. 
To summarize, in equilibrium, those with even a modest preference for bequests 
accumulate capital assets and borrow during their working lives, and upon retirement, use 
                                                 
3 In this study we do not make a distinction between these two types of saving. For issues other than the 
ones we address in this paper this may be a crucial element of reality that would have to be incorporated 
into the abstraction. 
 
4 We permit an annuity payment upon death. It will be positive if the bequest preference parameter is not 
zero for anyone choosing the annuity strategy. 
5 As explained later, there is an additional requirement about the size of the spread.  
 
6 
capital income for consumption and interest payment on debt. Upon their death they 
bequeath all their net worth.  Households with little or no bequest motive buy annuities 
during their working years and use annuity benefits to finance their consumption over 
their retirement years. 
 As mention earlier, we abstract from the small amount of direct borrowing and 
lending  between  households  and  assume  that  all  borrowing  and  lending  between 
households is intermediated through financial institutions. Furthermore, in light of the 
finding that the premium for bearing non-diversifiable aggregate risk is small in models 
consistent with growth and business cycle facts, our analysis abstracts from aggregate 
risk.
6  
The intermediation technology is constant returns to scale with intermediation 
costs  being  proportional  to  the  amount  intermediated.  To  calibrate  the  constant  of 
proportionality, we use Flow of Funds Account statistics and data from National Income 
and  Product  Accounts.  The  calibrated  value  of  this  parameter  equals  the  net  interest 
income of financial intermediaries, divided by the quantity of intermediated debt, and is 
approximately 2 percent.
7 
In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the return on equity and the borrowing 
rate are identical, since the households who borrow are also marginal in equity markets. 
In our framework, government debt is intermediated at zero cost, and thus its return is 
                                                 
6 Using a model with no capital accumulation, Mehra and Prescott (1985) find a small equity premium. 
McGrattan and Prescott (2000) find that the equity premium is small in the growth model if it is restricted 
to be consistent with growth and business cycle facts. Lettau and Uhlig (2000) introduce habit formation 
into the standard growth model and find that the equity premium is small if the model parameters are 
restricted to be consistent with the business cycle facts. Many others using the growth model restricted to 
be consistent with the macro economic growth and business cycle facts have found the same thing. 




equal to the household lending rate. An important feature is that the government can 
borrow at a lower rate than can households, which mirrors reality. 
In our model, all households in a cohort have identical labor income at every 
point in their working life. As a consequence of this, there is little difference in cross 
sectional  consumption  at  a  point  in  time.  However,  sizable  differences  in  net  worth 
develop within a cohort over their working years.  One implication is that preferences for 
bequests cannot be ignored when studying net worth distributions. 
The paper is organized as follows. The economy is specified in Section 2. In 
Section 3, we discuss the decision problem of the households. Section 4 deals with the 
aggregation  of  individual  behavior,  Section  5  with  the  relevant  balance  sheets,  and 
Section 6 characterizes the balanced growth equilibrium. We calibrate the economy in 
Section 7. In Section 8, we present and discuss our results. Section 9 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Economy 
In order to build a model that captures the large amount of observed borrowing 
and lending, as well as the large amount of resources used in this process, we introduce 
three key features of reality. The first feature is differences in bequest preferences, the 
second  is  an  uncertain  length  of  retirement,  and  the  third  is  costly  intermediation  of 
borrowing and lending between households. This leads some households to buy costly 
annuities that make payments throughout the retirement years. Since buying an annuity is 
isomorphic to lending, households choosing the annuity option are the lenders in our 
model. Households with high bequest utility save by increasing their net worth, which is 
their holding of productive capital less their debt. 
We model an overlapping generations economy, and consider its balanced growth  
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path equilibrium. All households born at a given date are identical in all respects except 
for their bequest preference parameter . They all have identical preferences with respect 
to consumptions over their lifetime, so the only dimension over which they differ is  . 
Those with a not small  (type-B) borrow and own capital; others with  or weak 
preferences for bequest (type-A) lend by acquiring annuities. 
What  motivates  bequests?  While  a  casual  consideration  of  bequests  naturally 
assumes that they exist because of parents’ altruistic concern for the economic well-being 
of their offspring, results in Menchik and David (1983), Hurd (1989), Wilhelm (1996), 
Laitner and Juster (1996), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1997), Laitner and Ohlsson 
(2001), Kopczuk and Lupton (2007), and Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2008) 
suggest  otherwise:  households  with  children  do  not,  in  general,  exhibit  behavior  in 
greater accord with a bequest motive than do childless households. This, we think, leads 
us to conclude that the existing literature supports our assumption that some people have 
preferences  for  making  bequests.  These  empirical  results  lead  us  to  eschew  the 
perspective  of  Barro  (1974)  and  Becker  and  Barro  (1988),  who  postulate  that  each 
generation receives utility from the consumption of the generations to follow, and simply 
model bequests as being motivated by a well-defined “joy of giving,”
8 as in Abel and 
Warshawsky (1988) and Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2007).  
Households 
Any  systematic  consideration  of  bequests  mandates  that  the  analysis  be 
undertaken in the context of an overlapping generations model. Accordingly, we analyze 
an overlapping generations economy and determine its balanced growth behavior. Each 
                                                 
8 See also Hurd and Mandcada (1989), De Nardi, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1999), De Nardi (2004), and 
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2006).  
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period, a set of individuals of measure one enter the economy. Two types enter at each 
date: Type A, who derive no utility from leaving a bequest, and type-B, whose utility is 
an increasing function of the amount they bequeath.
9  The measure of type   is  
. The total measure of people born at each date is 1, so  . 
Individuals have finite expected lives. They enter the labor force at age 22, work 
for  years, and then retire.
10 Model age j is 0 when a person begins his or her working 
life.  The first year of retirement is model age . 
All  workers  receive  an  identical  wage  income.  Wage  income  grows  at  the 
economy’s  balanced  growth  rate  .  At  retirement,  individuals  face  idiosyncratic 
uncertainty about the length of their remaining lifetime. Their retirement lifetimes are 
exponentially distributed. Once individuals retire, the probability of surviving to the next 
period is  , where   is the probability of death. Expected life is  . We 
emphasize that there is no aggregate uncertainty.
11   
Individuals of type  , born at time t, order their preferences over age-contingent 
consumption and bequests by
12 
(2.1)        . 
                                                 
9 The “no utility from a bequest” assumption is a simplifying one and is not necessary for the analysis. All 
that is needed is the utility from bequest be sufficiently small that the type-A choose to acquire annuities. 
10 We implicitly assume that parents finance the consumption of their children under the age of 22; in other 
words, children’s consumption is a part of their parents’ consumption. 
11 The Blanchard (1985) model has individuals with exponential life. The Díaz-Giménez et al. (1992) 
model has individuals with both an exponential working life and an exponential retirement life. 
12 Our model has no factor giving rise to life cycle consumption patterns over the working life as in 
Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2002).  
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Here   is the discount factor and   is the strength of bequest parameter. Variable 
 is the period consumption of a j-year-old born at time t,
13 conditional on being alive 
at time t + j. An individual who is born at time t and dies at age   consumes nothing 
at  time  t  +  j  and  bequeaths    units  of  the  period  t  +  j  consumption  good  and 
consumes nothing subsequently. Each generation supplies one unit of labor inelastically 
for . Thus, aggregate labor supply is   given that the measure of each 
generation is 1. 
We only need to analyze the decision problems of an individual of a type   
individual born at time t = 0. The solution to the problem for a type  born at any other 
time t can be found using the fact that along a balanced growth path  
(2.2)     
Further, to simplify the notation, we use   to denote the consumption of a j-year-old at 
time j rather than . An analogous change of notation applies to the other variables. 
 
Production Technology 
  The aggregate production function is 
(2.3)     
(2.4)    . 
  is  capital,    is  labor,  and    is  the  labor-augmenting  technological  change 
parameter, which grows at a rate . The parameter   is chosen so that  . 
                                                 
13 In this paper, the first subscript represents calendar time and the second subscript represents the age at 
that time.  
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Output is produced competitively, so 
(2.5)     
(2.6)    , 
where  is the depreciation rate,   is both the household borrowing rate and the return 
on equity, and   is the wage rate. 
Income is received as either wage income  or gross capital income . Thus,  
(2.7)    , 
where    and .  Components  of  output  are 
consumption  , investment  , and intermediation services ; thus, 
(2.8)    . 
Along a balanced growth path, investment   and  . 
Financial Intermediation Technology 
  The  intermediation  technology  displays  constant  returns  to  scale,  with  the 
intermediation  cost  in  units  of  the  composite  output  good  being  proportional  to  the 
amount of borrowing and lending intermediated.  The cost is   times the amount of 
borrowing  and  lending  between  households.
14    The  intermediary  also  intermediates 
between households lending to the government.  There are no costs associated with this 
intermediation.  The intermediary receives interest rate   on its lending to households 
and  effectively  pays  interest  rate    on  its  borrowing  from  households.  Given  the 
technology, equilibrium interest rates satisfy  
                                                 
14 Miller and Upton (1974) pioneered in having a financial sector in their dynamic general equilibrium 
model.  They had no intermediation costs.  
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    . 
The lending contract between households and intermediaries is not the standard 
one, but rather an annuity contract. A household can enter into an annuity contract at age 
0.    An  annuity  contract  specifies  an  age-contingent  premium  payment  path  during 
working life, a benefit path contingent on being alive subsequent to retirement, and a 
payment upon death. The amount being lent by an individual who has chosen the annuity 
contract is the value of pension fund reserves for that contract at that point in time.  These 
reserves are equal to the expected present value of future payments less the expected 
present value of future premium payments, if any.  The present value is calculated using r 
the  lending  rate  at  which  households  can  lend  to  intermediaries.  Competitive 
intermediaries will offer any annuity contract with the property that the expected present 
value of benefits is equal to the present value of the premiums using   in the present 
value calculations.  
The alternative to entering into an annuity contract to save for retirement is to 
accumulate capital and to borrow to partially finance that capital. Our model has three 
sectors:  a  household  sector,  a  government  sector,  and  a  financial  sector.    The  non-
financial business sector is consolidated with household sector.  
Government Policy 
Government policy is characterized by a tax rate   on labor income, an interest 
rate    on government debt, and the path of government debt  .  The 
feasible government policy parameters are constrained to a one dimensional manifold. 
Theoretically it does not matter which of the three policy parameters is picked. We chose 
 because it simplified finding the equilibrium and there is a wealth of observations as to  
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a reasonable value for its choice.  The government finances interest payments on its debt 
by  issuing  new  debt  and  by  taxing  labor  income.  The  government’s  period  t  budget 
constraint is 
(2.9)    . 
Since   in balanced growth, 
(2.10)    . 
The government pursues a tax rate policy that pegs
15  , which equals the interest 
rate on government debt. This being a balanced growth analysis, government debt grows 
at rate  , which means that the government deficits are positive and grow at rate   
as well. 
The intermediary holds all the government debt, and there are no intermediation 
costs associated with holding this asset on the part of the intermediary. 
Bequests 
 Aggregate bequests at date t are 
(2.11)     . 
We let   . The inheritance of a type-B born at   is 
(2.12)         
and is received at date  . The inheritance of a  type-A born at   is 
(2.13)    . 
The reason that a type-A’s inheritance is slightly smaller than that of a type-B is that their 
inheritances are intermediated and intermediation is costly.  
                                                 
15 In this paper, we fix this at 3 percent. This is discussed further in Section 7 on calibration.  
 
14 
3. Optimal Individual Decisions 
  We consider the optimal individual decision problem, taking as given (i) the size 
of the inheritance the individual will receive at model age 30 (chronological age 52), (ii) 
wages at each date of the individual’s working life, (iii) the labor income tax rate  , and 
(iv) the borrowing and lending rates   and  . The first problem facing an individual is 
whether to choose the annuity strategy A or the no annuity strategy B. The parameters of 
the calibrated economy are such that a type-A will choose the annuity strategy, while a 
type-B  will  choose  the  no  annuity  strategy.  The  second  problem  is  to  determine  the 
optimal lifetime consumption and savings decisions conditional on the strategy chosen. 
We determine, given  , the optimal consumption/saving behavior for each strategy and 
the resulting lifetime utility, and then determine which of the two strategies is best for 
that individual type.   
A convention followed is that a bar over a variable denotes a constant. In the case 
where  the  constant  depends  upon  a  person’s  type,  that  is,  on  ,  this  functional 
dependence is indicated. This is necessary because the best strategy will differ across 
household types. 
The Best No Annuity Strategy 
This problem can be split into two sub-problems. The first problem is the one 
after retirement, which is stationary and is solved using recursive techniques. The state 
variable is net worth, which is in units of the current period consumption good. The value 
of a unit of k is   to a household choosing the no annuity strategy. The second 
problem is to determine consumptions and savings over the working life.   
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The problem becomes stationary and recursive at retirement age T, with net worth 
w being the state variable. The value function   is the maximal obtainable expected 
current and future utility flows if a retiree is alive and has net worth w. The optimality 
equation is 
(3.1)     
The solution to this optimality equation has the form 
(3.2)    , 
where  
(3.3)    .  
The optimal consumption/saving policy for retirees is 
(3.4)      
The bequests, conditional on j − 1 being the person’s last year of life, is 
(3.5)    . 
The problem facing an individual at birth who follows the no annuity strategy 
(which we call strategy B because it is the one chosen by those with a sufficiently strong 
preference for making a bequest) is  
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(3.6)     
Here   is the present value of wages and inheritance of an individual born at  . The 
solution (see Appendix 2 for more details) is 
(3.7)     
where     . 
  The preretirement age j net worth of an individual following this strategy satisfies 
(3.8)   
The Best Annuity Strategy 
The best annuity strategy for a type   is the solution to the following:  
(3.9)   
where   is the lending rate and  
(3.10)    .  
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The constant   is the present value of future wage income and inheritances using the 
lending rate r of a person born at  . The superscript A denotes the annuity strategy 
and not an individual type. In equilibrium, type-A will choose strategy A. 
There are other constraints, specifically, that the worker choosing this strategy 
does not borrow. For the economies considered in this study, these constraints are not 
binding and can therefore be ignored. If, however, the economy were such that the no-
borrowing constraint were binding for some j, then the solution below would not be the 
solution to the problem formulated above.  
The nature of the annuity contract is that the payment to a retiree who is alive at 
age   is  . If the individual dies at age j, payment  is made to that person’s estate. 
The solution to this program is 
(3.11)     
(3.12)     
The net worth of an individual choosing this strategy is the pension fund reserves 
associated with that individual’s annuity contract. Pension fund reserves (from the point 
of view of the intermediary) for a given annuity contract for an individual born at   at 
age j in equilibrium equals the expected present value at time   of payments that will 
be made less the value (at time   as well) of premiums that will be received.  
For workers, they can be determined as the present value of past premiums. Thus, 
pension fund reserves for individuals’ annuity holders born at  at age j satisfy 
(3.13)    
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For retirees, conditional on being alive, pension fund reserves for individuals born at 
 at age j are equal to the expected present value of the future payments: 
(3.14)     
The Best Strategy 
  In general there will be a   such that a household chooses strategy B if its   
exceeds   and the annuity strategy otherwise.  Propositions 1 is used to establish this 
result under a restriction that is satisfied for the calibrated model economy. 
Proposition 1: If       then     . 
Proof: In Appendix 1.□ 
 
The  value  of    affects  the  relative  attractiveness  of  the  two  strategies.  
Proposition 2 establishes that an -household will choose the annuity strategy if    is 
sufficiently small and the no annuity strategy if   is sufficiently large. 
Proposition  2:  For  sufficiently  small  ,  .  For  sufficiently  large ,  
.  
Proof outline:  For small non-negative  , the value of insurance associated with strategy 
A exceeds the value of the higher return associated with strategy B.  This is why strategy 
A dominates for small  .  For large  , the cost of the annuity is large and the higher 
return  associated  with  the  no  annuity  strategy  dominates.    This  is  why  strategy  B 
dominates for large  .□  
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Figure 1 plots the difference in utilities for the two strategies, as a function of  , 
for the prices, tax rate, and bequest for our calibrated economy. We see that individuals 








4. Aggregate Behavior of the Household Sector 
Aggregate Consumption 
Aggregate consumption depends upon the labor tax rate   and inheritance   as 
well as the prices . Equilibrium prices do not depend upon the household side, 
and can be determined from the policy choice of r and profit-maximizing conditions. 
Having formulated the optimal consumption strategies for the two types of individuals, 
we characterize the aggregate consumption, asset holdings, and bequest at time   by 
individual type given   and   and the equilibrium prices. Two aggregate equilibrium 
relations must be solved for the variables   and  .  
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There are two types of households  . The type-A has   and will in 
equilibrium choose the annuity strategy A given the model economy. The type-B has  , 
which is sufficiently large that the equilibrium is such that they chose not annuitize. The 
measure of type-i of age j at   is  
(4.1)     
The aggregate consumption of the type-i households at time 0 is  : 
(4.2)    . 
Here  we  have  used  the  fact  that  each  subsequent  generation  has  a  consumption-age 
profile that is higher by a factor of   in balanced growth. 
  Aggregate consumption is 
(4.3)    . 
Aggregate Asset Holdings 
The aggregate net worth at time 0 of a type   is 
(4.4)    . 
Net worth is prior to consumption and receipt of wage income and includes net interest 
income  and  dividend  income.  In  the  case  of  the  intermediary,  net  worth  includes 
intermediation cost liabilities.  Net worth is prior to consumption and is denominated in 




At time 0 the measure of the people aged   who die and leave a bequest is 
; thus, the total bequests given by these households is 
  . 
Hence, the aggregate bequests at time 0 are 
(4.5)    . 
Aggregate Private Debt 
  The aggregate indebtedness of a type-B satisfies 
(4.6)    , 
because the price of existing capital in terms of the consumption good is   and the 
household is obligated to make a payment of  . 
5. Balance Sheets 
  Assets and liabilities are beginning of period numbers and are in units of the 
consumption  good.  We  consider  only  economies  for  which  there  is  intermediated 
borrowing and lending in equilibrium. Given there is a large amount of intermediated 
borrowing and lending, these economies are the ones of empirical interest.  
Type-A Sector: The assets of the type-A consist of pension fund reserves. They have no 
liabilities. The value of these pension reserves (in terms of the consumption good) is: 





Balance Sheet of Type-A Households 




  Net worth 
 
Hence, their net worth satisfies  
. 
Type-B Sector: Those following the no annuity strategy have aggregate debt   
and hold all the economy’s capital, . Their balance sheet is as follows: 
Balance Sheet of Type-B Households 
Assets  Liabilities 
   
  Net worth 
 
Here we have adjusted the assets and liabilities by a factor   to get the net 
worth in units of the consumption good. Their net worth is 
. 
Financial  Intermediary  Sector:  The  assets  of  the  financial  intermediary  are  the 
liabilities  of  the  government  and  the  type-B  households,  while  its  liabilities  are  the 
pension assets of type-A households and the amount payable for intermediation services. 
The net worth of the financial intermediaries is zero.  
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Balance Sheet of the Intermediaries 
Assets  Liabilities 
Government debt = 
 
Pension promises = 
 
Private debt = 
 
Amounts payable for 
intermediation services = 
 
  Net worth = 0 
 
Government: The assets of the government are the present value of the tax receipts on 
labor income, while its liabilities are the debt it has outstanding. 
Balance Sheet of the Government 
 Assets  Liabilities 
   
  Net worth = 0 
 
Since  labor  is  supplied  inelastically  and  taxed  at  a  rate  ,  the  government 
effectively owns a fraction   of an individual’s time endowment (now and in all future 
periods). In our model economy, the net worth of the government is zero and government 






6. Equilibrium Relations 
We  normalize  Y t o   1  and  determine  the  value  of  a  set  of  balanced  growth 
variables at  . All variables grow at rate   except aggregate labor supply, which is 
constant and equal to 40,  , financial intermediation, and aggregate consumption. Given 
that Y has been normalized to 1 at time 0, the cost share relationships determine time 0 
capital stock K and wage e: 
(6.1)      
(6.2)     
  From the intermediary’s problem, the lending rate satisfies 
(6.3)    . 
Three Equilibrium Conditions 
Prices   are determined from policy and technology. Therefore, only   
and   are needed to completely specify the household budget constraints. Conditional on 
these variables, aggregate consumption,  , and aggregate intermediation,  , 
will be determined by aggregating individual household variables. Aggregation, given the 
individual decisions conditional on    and  , is specified in Appendix 2.  
One aggregate equilibrium condition is the aggregate resource constraint, 
(6.4)    , 
where   is investment. Intermediation services satisfy 
(6.5)     . 
We assume that type-B households hold all the capital and the intermediaries none. This  
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is done to resolve an unimportant indeterminacy. Increasing the amount of capital held by 
a type-B and that type-B’s indebtedness by the same amount does not affect that type-B’s 
net worth, which is what is relevant. This portfolio shift by a type-B household is offset 
by a portfolio shifts by other type-B households. The aggregate indebtedness of a type-B 
is denoted by  and is equal to  . 
  The second equilibrium condition is that the inheritance of households at a point 
in time equals aggregate bequests at that point in time. We consider   and let   
be the aggregate bequest at that time. The second equilibrium condition is  
(6.6)    . 
  There  is  a  third  equilibrium  condition,  namely,  the  government’s  budget 
constraint.  This  constraint    equates  payments  to  receipts.  Given 
,  , and the normalization   , the time 0 government 
budget constraint is 
(6.7)    . 
Equilibrium 
The  first  two  equilibrium  conditions  are  linear  in  ,  so  solving  for  a  candidate 
solution is straightforward. This solution is the equilibrium only if in addition (i) the best 
strategy for type-B households is the no annuity strategy; (ii) the best strategy for type-A 
households is the annuity strategy; (iii) type-B borrows and does not lend; and (iv) type-
A lend and does not borrow. The reason for the last constraint is that these equilibrium 
conditions  hold  provided  that  the  no-borrowing  constraint  on  annuity  holders  is  not 




The  parameters  that  need  to  be  calibrated  are  those  related  to  the 
households ; the intermediation technology parameter { }; the 
production good technology parameters  ; and the policy parameter  . The other 
two policy parameters   are endogenous. As mentioned before, the choice   as a 
parameter and τ as an endogenous variable is only for convenience; reversing their roles 
will not affect the results described in Section 8.    
 
Many of these parameters are well documented in the literature; others are not. 
We proceed by listing the parameters with the selected values and a brief motivation. 
 
Parameters Associated with Individuals 
 (Annuity holders’ c grows at almost 2 percent over their lifetimes) 
 (Implies a post-retirement life expectancy of 20 years) 
 (Assumption: Type-A individuals have low bequest intensity) 
 (Assumption: Type-B individuals have high bequest intensity) 
 (Workers retire at chronological age 63) 
 (Specified so that the amount intermediated matches U.S. data) 
   
Intermediation parameters 




 (Assumption about government fiscal policy) 
The motivation for this policy is that this has been the approximate return on lending by 
households (See McGrattan and Prescott, 2003). 
Goods production parameters 
 (Capital income share) 
 (Average growth rate of U.S. per capita output) 
 (Consistent with capital output ratio = 3.4, given  . 
In calibrating   we proceed as follows.  Our model economy has household, 
government, and financial intermediary sectors.  All nonfinancial business borrowing is 
consolidated  with  the  household  sector.  We  start  with  the  net  interest  income  of  the 
financial intermediation sector. Fees are a small part of this sector’s product and most of 
them are for transaction services, which is not intermediation in the sense used in this 
study. Using data from NIPA
16 for year 2007, the interest received amounted to 0.165 
times gross national product (GNP)
17 and interest paid amounted to 0.110 times GNP. To 
estimate  the  services  associated  with  intermediating  borrowing  and  lending,  we  first 
subtracted intermediation services furnished without payment to households as we did 
not want to include implicit purchases of transaction services by the household. We also 
subtracted part of bad debt viewing it as interest not received by the intermediary to 
obtain  an  estimate  of  the  cost  of  intermediating  borrowing  and  lending  between 
households of 3.4 percent of GNP in 2007. See Table 1. 
                                                 
16 Source: NIPA (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2007) Tables 7.11 and 2.4.5. 
17 Source: NIPA Table 1.7.5.  
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Using  data  from  the  Flow  of  Funds,  we  found  the  debt  outstanding  of  our 
household sector, which includes nonfinancial businesses, equals 1.72 times GNP.
18 The 
implied intermediation spread is thus 2.0 percent and in turn the calibrated  . This 
number  results  in  the  after-tax  returns  being  close  to  their  historical  averages  (see 
McGrattan and Prescott (2003, 2005)). 
Table 1 
Financial Intermediary Sector Accounts Relative to GNP Year 2007 
Interest received   0.165  Table 7.11 NIPA line 28 
      Less interest paid  0.110  Table 7.11 NIPA line 4 
Equals net interest income  0.055   
      Less services furnished without payment    0.016  Table 2.4.5 NIPA line 89 
      Less bad debt expenses    0.005  Table 7.16 NIPA line 12* 
Equals services for intermediating household         
borrowing and lending 
0.034   
     
Amount intermediated between households  1.721 
Table D.3 Flow of Funds 
(Total amount in column 1 
less state, local, and federal 
government) 
     
 
*This datum is for 2005, the latest for which this datum is currently available.  We assumed half of the total 
bad debt was in that of financial intermediaries. 
 
In dealing with transaction costs associated with buying and selling assets and 
fees such as those paid by investors to say a trust company, we follow the convention 
used by US national accounts and do not include them as a part of intermediation costs.  
The assets in our model are capital K, government debt, Type B household debt, and 
pension fund reserves.  With regard to K transactions, say the brokerage fees associated 
                                                 
18 Source: Flow of Funds (Board of Governors, 2007) Table D.3. See Table 2 above for further details.  
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with transferring ownership of an owner occupied house, NIPA treats these costs as an 
investment  and  justifies  this  as  putting  the  house  to  more  productive  use.    With 
government debt transfer of ownership costs are zero in our model and virtually zero in 
fact.  Pension fund reserves are not traded between households, and therefore there are 
almost no costs associated with transferring ownership.  The total costs of buying and 
selling  of  household  debt  between  financial  intermediaries  are  small  and  are  part  of 
intermediation  costs.  Households  incur  brokerage  fees  associated  with  transferring 
ownership of financial securities between households. These fees are not payment for 
intermediating  debt  between  households  and  therefore  not  part  of  the  cost  of 
intermediated  borrowing  and  lending  between  households.  Brokerage  fees  paid  by 
intermediaries are part of the costs of intermediating borrowing and lending between 
households. 
8. Results 
We considered four values for  , a parameter for which we have little information. For 
each value of   we search for the for which the intermediated borrowing and lending 
between households is 1.72 times GNP. The results are summarized in Table 2, which 
shows results not sensitive to the size of the bequest preference parameter . Given that 




                                                 





Summary of Aggregate Results 
 
Economy         
         
  0.833  0.838  0.851  0.867 
  0.167  0.162  0.149  0.133 
         
National Accounts         
  0.636  0.639  0.651  0.663 
  0.132  0.128  0.117  0.104 
X  0.198  0.198  0.198  0.198 
I  0.034  0.034  0.034  0.034 
Y  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Depreciation  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13 
Compensation  0.70  0.70  0.70  0.70 
Profits  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17 
         
Net Worth         
  Type-A  6.29  6.33  6.42  6.53 
  Type-B  1.66  1.66  1.66  1.66 
         
Government Debt/Y  4.55  4.59  4.68  4.79 
Bequest/Y  0.0341  0.0347  0.0365  0.0390 




Balance Sheet of Households 
 
Table 3 
Balance Sheet of Households 




   
 
Table 3 details the aggregate balance sheet data for U.S households implied by 
our model. Our model is calibrated so that both the privately held capital stock ( ) and 
the  intermediated  household  borrowing  and  lending  ( )  match  US  statistics; 
government debt ( ) is endogenously determined. One test of our model is how well it 
replicates  this  and  other  statistics,  such  as  bequests  and  inheritances,  for  the  U.S 
economy. We examine each in turn.  
Government Debt 
Government debt in our model, which is 4.6 times GNP, may at first sight appear 
large relative to U.S. federal, state and local government debt, which was only 0.5 GNP 
in 2007. However, there are huge implicit annuity-like liabilities of the U.S. government, 
such as Social Security Retirement and Medicare benefits. Households value the expected 
present value of these annuity-like net benefits and consider them as assets that contribute 
to their net worth. Hence, in the aggregate balance sheet of our model economy, the 
empirical counterpart of model government debt is explicit government debt plus the  
 
33 
expected present value of these net benefits. Careful studies by Gokhale and Smetters 
(2003 and 2006) estimate the present value of these net benefits as between 4.2 and 5 
GNP.
20 In light of this, the stock of government debt in our model is reasonable. 
An additional point is that if no one had a bequest motive, the steady-state capital 
stock would be the same, namely, 3.4 times GNP, and government debt in our model 
would be slightly larger. Policy and not nature of bequest preferences is what determines 
the capital-output ratio. 
Bequests 
A surprising finding is that the model’s prediction regarding the magnitude of the 
bequests is insensitive to the strength of the bequest motive. We believe this insensitivity 
is due to the fact that bequest expenditures in the intertemporal budget constraint are 
small relative to the sum of all event contingent total expenditures, coupled with the fact 
that the measure of agents who leave a bequest (type B) is a small fraction of the total 
population.  
Total annual bequests in our model, as seen in Table 3, are 0.035 times GNP for 
. The aggregate value of estates in 2007 that exceeded $675,000 was 0.00123 
times GNP.
21  Some of these estates are inter-spousal and should not be included. This is 
more than offset by bequest that were under the limit for which estate tax returns had to 
be filed. Adding these and inter vivo transfers and adjusting for underreporting of gifts 
associated with the transfer of family businesses to the younger generation would result 
in aggregate bequests being close to model aggregate bequests. 
                                                 
20 Their estimates were $ 44 trillion in 2002 and $63 trillion in 2005. 
21  Department of Treasury (2007), Historic Table 17, p. 203.  
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Modigliani’s (1988) estimate of bequest flows is close to the flow in our model. 
He reports bequests of 0.02 times GNP.  He adds life insurance, death benefits and newly 
established trusts to conclude that bequests are at least 0.027 times GNP. 
Another  measure  of  the  size  of  bequests  is  the  amount  an  individual  inherits 
expressed in units of the individual’s annual wage at time of inheritance. Each individual 
receives at chronological age 52 an amount equal to 1.98 times their annual wage at that 
time.  Menchick and David (1983) estimate average the inheritance received by all males 
to be $20,000 (in 1967 dollars). We estimate the average gross annual wage for that year 
as  $8840,  arriving  at  a  ratio  of  inheritance  received  to  annual  wage  equal  to  2.26.
22 
However,  correcting  for  inter-spousal  transfers  the  inheritance  received  could  well 
reduced it to $13,220, which results in a ratio of inheritance received to annual wage of 




Another variable of interest is the fraction of wealth that is inherited. A significant 
component of wealth is human capital, which is the present value of wages in our model 
world  where  labor  is  supplied  inelastically.  The  other  part  is  the  present  value  of 
inheritance. As shown in Table 4, human capital is about 95.5 percent of wealth at entry 
into the workforce and would be higher if there were population growth. These results are 
for a Type A households, who discount using a 3 percent rate. The share is a little lower 
                                                 
22  Nominal GDP in 1967 was $833 billion. Assuming that 70 percent of GDP is labor income (consistent 
with our model economy) we obtain an estimate of total wage income of $583 billion in 1967. Then, since 
the total employment in that year was 65.9 million, the average gross annual wage income is $8840. 
23 We examined the consequence of population growth and found that they were small.  Bequests fall to 
0.03 times GNP as the population growth increases to the point at which the growth rate of the economy 
equals the interest rate.   
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for type-B households who use a 5 percent discount rate.  Anything that reduces the ratio 
of bequests to GNP reduces this number, so for the model with a 1 percent population 
growth rate, as in the United States, this ratio is near 97 percent. 
Table 4 
Inheritance as Fraction of Wealth at Entry into Workforce 
         
Type-A  0.044  0.045  0.047  0.050 
Type-B  0.035  0.036  0.038  0.040 
 
The issues as to the importance of bequest for the size of the capital stock are 
mute  in  our  model,  as  policy  determines  the  capital  stock  and  not  the  nature  of 
preferences for bequests. However, a statistic of interest is the one estimated by Kotlikoff 
and Summers (1981). This statistic is the present value of inheritances people alive have 
received, using a 3 percent interest rate.  Their estimate of this number is 0.80 times the 
total household net worth. Modigliani’s (1988) estimate of this number is much smaller: 
0.20. Modigliani (Table 1, page 19) presents a number of other estimates, all of which 
range between 0.10 and 0.20.  This ratio number for our model economy is 0.18, which is 
in line with these estimates. 
In our model economy 93 percent of bequests are accidental. We came up with 
this  number  as  follows.  Setting    for  type-B  households  and  requiring  type-B 
households  to  follow  the  no  annuity  strategy  results  in  this  number.    Treating  these 
accidental bequests as savings for retirement along with all type-A savings implies that 





Although our model was not developed to match both the explicit and implicit 
liabilities  of  the  government,  the  aggregate  savings  predicted  by  our  theory  are 
approximately equal to that observed. The total government debt and bequests / GDP 
implied by our model is in line with the US historical experience. This, we believe, is an 
important testable implication. 
Some Micro Findings 
Our abstraction has implications for micro observations as well. Unlike the macro 
findings, the model’s micro findings are not a quantitative theory of the consequence of 
the bequest motive for the distributions of consumption, net worth, and equity holdings 
and consequently must be interpreted with care. They do, however, show that the bequest 
motive, or for that matter any factor that leads people to partially finance their capital 
acquisitions with debt, is quantitatively important for these statistics. With this caveat, the 
micro distributional relations for our model economy are as follows. 
  Figure 2 plots the lifetime consumption patterns of the two types of households. 
Type-A’s consumption grows at a constant annual rate of 1.97 percent throughout their 
lifetime.  Type-B’s starts out lower and grows more rapidly during their working life, 
with this growth rate being 3.95 percent.  Upon retirement the consumption growth rate 
turns negative, falling to -0.95 percent. At retirement a type-B retiree’s consumption is 
higher than an equal age type-A retiree.
24   
 
                                                 
24 There is a rich literature on the life cycle consumption patterns, including the works of Attanasio, Banks, 
Meghir, and Weber (1999) and Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2008), among others. This is not the concern of 
this paper, but the fact that life cycle patterns differ for those choosing to annuitize and those choosing 











Figure 3 plots cross-sectional consumption by age for the two types. All type-A that are 
alive  have  virtually  the  same  consumption.  Young  type-B  workers  have  lower 
consumption  and  older  workers  have  higher  consumption.  For  the  type-B  retirees, 



















Net worth by age 
In  Figure  4  we  plot  net  worth  relative  to  current  annual  wage  income,  which  has  a 
stationary distribution.  At retirement the net worth of a type-A household is 12 times the 
annual wage, and that of a type-B is 19 times the annual wage.  The disparity in net worth 
(corrected for age) is modest, being a maximum of about 1.6 at retirement age.  After 
retirement disparity falls until age 78, and then starts growing with the type-A household 
becoming the one with the greater net worth.  The jump in net worth at chronological age 










Net Worth as a Function of Age in Units of Annual Wage Income 
 
Lorenz curves 
Figure  5  plots  the  Lorenz  curves  for  consumption,  net  worth,  and  capital  or  equity 
holdings.  In the case of capital, we assume all type-B households have the same ratio of 
debt liabilities to capital in their portfolios in order to resolve the portfolio indeterminacy 
at the individual level.  We truncate the distribution at age 112, so the curves are not 
exact, but are very good approximations given the small fraction of population over this 
age.   
  Our model is not designed to address issues about wealth distribution as we have 
abstracted from any heterogeneity in human capital. All agents have the same earnings 
stream. Our principal findings are that there is almost no disparity in consumption levels  
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and sizable disparities in net worth levels. This shows that the dispersion in net worth is a 
bad proxy for dispersion in consumption.
25 
  In our model economy, all individuals have the same human capital endowments.  
If the model were modified to have people earn proportionally different wages, to a first 
approximation  an  individual’s  allocation  is  proportional  to  that  individual’s  wage.
26  
Thus, introducing wage disparity would add disparity in consumption and net worth. 
Introducing  entrepreneurs  (Cagetti  and  De  Nardi  (2006))  and  idiosyncratic  risk 
(Castãneda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003) and Chatterjee et al. (2007)) would 
increase disparity as well.  
 
 
                                                 
25 T h e  G i n i  c o e f f i c i e n t s  f o r  t h e  C o n s u m p t i o n  a n d  N e t  W o r t h  L o r e n z  c u r v e s  a r e  0 . 0 3 8  a n d  0 . 3 5 ,  
respectively. 





Lorenz curve for Consumption, Net Worth, and Capital 
 
Cost of financial market constraints 
  What are the gains to a household of having access to the equity market at no 
intermediation cost? Table 5 reports the cost of not having this access, which was the 
case for most Americans prior to the development of low-cost indexed mutual funds, as 
being about 4.0 percent of wealth at time of entry into the workforce. This wealth is the 




Cost to a Type-A of Not Having Access to the  
Annuity Market in Units of Wealth at Entry into Workforce 
  Change in   
1/3  0.77% 
1  0.79% 
3  0.84% 
6  0.90% 
 
Table 6 
Cost to a Type-B of Not Being Permitted to Hold Equity Directly 
 in Units of Wealth at Entry into Workforce 
  Change in   
1/3  1.24% 
1  4.00% 
3  9.74% 
6  15.77% 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show the percentage increase in either  , that is wealth at time of entry 
into the workforce, which is necessary to compensate an  in wealth equivalents 
if forced to switch to a system other than their preferred choice. Since both consumption 
and  bequest  are  linear  functions  of  initial  wealth,  the  percentage  changes  in  both 
consumptions and bequests are the same as the percentage change in initial wealth.  
What  are  the  costs  to  a  type-A  if  for  some  reason,  such  as  adverse  selection 
problems or legal constraints, they do not have access to annuity markets and must use 
the  equity  option  for  saving?  The  cost  is  small,  being  approximately  0.8  percent  of 
lifetime consumption.  
 
44 
Implications for the Equity Premium 
In our framework, there is no equity premium as there is no aggregate uncertainty. 
The return on equity and the borrowing rate are both equal to 5%. This is a no arbitrage 
condition. The return on government debt is 3%. If we use the conventional definition of 
the equity premium – the return on a broad equity index less the return on government 
debt – we would erroneously conclude that in our model the equity premium was 2%.  
The difference in the government borrowing rate and the return on equity is not an equity 
premium; it arises because of the wedge between borrowing and lending rates. 
Analogously if in the U.S economy borrowing and lending rates for equity investors 
differ, (and they do) the equity premium should be measured relative to the investor 
borrowing rate rather than the government’s borrowing rate (the investor lending rate). 
Measuring the premium relative to the government’s borrowing rate artificially increases 
the premium for bearing aggregate risk by the difference between the investor’s 
borrowing and lending rates.
27 If such a correction were made to the results reported in 









                                                 
27 For a detailed exposition of this and related issues, the reader is referred to Mehra and Prescott (2008).  
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9. Concluding Comments 
  In this paper, we develop a heterogeneous household economy where households 
differ along only one dimension: their preferences for bequest. In equilibrium, 
households with a low desire to bequeath lend and hold annuities, while those with a high 
desire to bequeath borrow and own capital. This is important because the total amount of 
borrowing by households and the government must equal the amount lent by households. 
Our simple framework mimics reality with respect to both the amount of intermediated 
borrowing and lending between households and the average spread in borrowing and 
lending rates resulting from intermediation costs. In addition, amount of aggregate 
savings predicted by the theory is approximately equal to the observed amount of 
aggregate savings. This is an important test of our theory, as it was not developed to 
match both the explicit and implicit liabilities of the government.
28 
We  view  this  as  a  first  step  in  what  we  think  will  prove  to  be  a  productive 
research program. Possible extensions include building in differential survival rates and 
addressing the issues of adverse selection and moral hazard when pricing annuities. This 
extension might justify our requirement that people choose between the annuity and the 
no annuity strategies early in their careers. This research program, if successful, will 
require extension of the theory of household lifetime consumption behavior because the 
bequest motive is not the only salient factor that differentiates people. Differences in 
preferences  with  respect  to  consumption  today  versus  consumption  in  the  future  and 
differences in preferences that give rise to differences in lifetime labor supply are likely 
to be important as well.  
                                                 
28 We thank one of the referees for bringing this to our attention.  
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Another  possible  extension  is  to  model  non-steady-state  behavior  as  in 
Geanakoplos, Magill, and Quinzii (2004) who consider the importance of demographic 
waves for stock market valuation or as in Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2007) for saving 
behavior within the overlapping generation framework.  
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1 
 
   The prices   , tax rate , and inheritance implied by   are given to an 
individual.  Note    .  Let    represent  the  maximum  attainable 
utility of an agent of measure zero in this economy who follows strategy A (annuity) or B 
(bequest) respectively as a function of  . Define  .  
 




Proof: The maximum utility as a function of   attainable by an agent who follows an 












 (  and   are defined in Section 3). 
 














(  and   are defined in Section 3). 
 
Using the properties of the logarithm function and defining  = =  
 
(A1.1)    
 
Since the first term is independent of   it follows that 
 
(A1.2)     , 
 
where   which does not depend on  . 
 
This 
implies the second term in (A1.2) is positive, i.e.,   
 
To prove our assertion that   is positive, we proceed in three steps: 
a.  We show that  ; 
b.  We show that  ; and that 




Some straightforward algebra yields   
 
   
(A1.3)            
 
From (A1.3) it is readily seen that  . This follows since the last 
term tends to  and all the other terms are bounded. This coupled with the fact that 
 proves that  . 
 
The second derivative   is negative by direct differentiation, 
,  
 
since the denominator is always positive and the numerator is negative. 
 
 
Finally it can be shown that   under the condition stated in the theorem. 





The last term in the above expression has already been shown to be positive. Thus a 
sufficient condition for this inequality is 
 
 . 
This inequality can be written as   
Since a), b), and c) are satisfied, it follows that  . QED  
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There are two types .  The A-type has   and in equilibrium choose the 
annuity strategy given the model economy.  The measure of type i of age j at   is 
(A2.1)      
Aggregate quantity for variable Z of type   agents at   is  , 
(A2.2)     , 
where   is the individual allocation of type-i at age j  born at  . Notice that we have 
used the fact that each subsequent generation has a consumption-age profile that is higher 
by a factor of   under balanced growth. Aggregate quantity of Z at time 0,   is 
       
Agent Type-B 
 
Aggregate assets of agent type-B and aggregate bequest 
 
The aggregate assets for B-type agents are computed using the law of motion of Net 


















(A2.4)     
 
     
 
and      
 








(A2.5)          , 
 
where from the individual problem 
 
     
 
Since    all bequests are coming from the type-B, and as shown in Section 3.1 is 
given by  
 
     
 
if a type-B dies prior to the end of the previous period subsequent to consuming, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Since the measure of agents dying at each age   is   the 














(A2.6)    
 
Aggregate consumption type B  
 
Similarly, using (A2.2) and (A2.3) the aggregate consumption of type B agents at time 0 
can be expressed as 
 
 











Agent Type A 
 
Aggregate assets of agent type A 
 
The  aggregate  bequest  is  measured  in  units  of  agent  type  B  assets,  therefore  the 
inheritance  received  by  agent  type  A  measured  in  her  assets’  units  is 
. The aggregate assets for agents type A are computed using the law 
of motion of Net Worth. From the individual problem,  
 
(A2.8)    
 
 




As  for  type  B,  the  summation  for  j=0,…,T    is  performed  numerically.  Since  in  the 
calibration,   .  From equation (3.11) consumption for type A agents, born at period 




Then, agents alive at time 0 of age j consume 
 
 
(A2.9)    
 











Aggregate consumption type A  
 
Again, using (A2.2) and (A2.9), the aggregate consumption of type A agents at time 0 
can be expressed as 
 




or     









Type B:           
Type A:     
Intermediary:    




There are three equilibrium conditions that can potentially be used to solve the model:  
 
1) Feasibility:       Y= +X+ ,  
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where     
 
2) Bequest=inheritance:     =  
 
3) Assets Markets      + = +K 
 
Since this is a linear system in   one equation is redundant, and the solution is 
straightforward. We chose to use the first two equilibrium conditions, and then we check 
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